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Abstract
Measurement creates trustworthy quantifications. But unified frameworks applicable to 
all sciences are still lacking and discipline-specific terms, concepts and practices hamper 
mutual understanding and identification of commonalities and differences. Transdisci-
plinary and philosophy-of-science analyses are used to compare metrologists’ structural 
framework of physical measurement with psychologists’ and social scientists’ fiat meas-
urement of constructs. The analyses explore the functions that measuring instruments 
and measurement-executing persons in themselves fulfil in data generation processes, and 
identify two basic methodological principles critical for measurement. (1) Data genera-
tion traceability requires that numerical assignments depend on the properties to be quanti-
fied in the study objects (object-dependence). Therefore, scientists must establish unbroken 
documented connection chains that directly link (via different steps) the quantitative entity 
to be measured in the study property with the numerical value assigned to it, thereby mak-
ing the assignment process fully transparent, traceable and thus reproducible. (2) Numeri-
cal traceability requires that scientists also directly link the assigned numerical value to 
known standards in documented and transparent ways, thereby establishing the results’ 
public interpretability (subject-independence). The article demonstrates how these prin-
ciples can be meaningfully applied to psychical and social phenomena, considering their 
peculiarities and inherent limitations, revealing that not constructs in themselves but only 
their indicators (proxies) can be measured. These foundational concepts allow to distin-
guish measurement-based quantifications from other (subjective) quantifications that may 
be useful for pragmatic purposes but lack epistemic authority, which is particularly impor-
tant for applied (e.g., legal, clinical) contexts. They also highlight new avenues for estab-
lishing transparency and replicability in empirical sciences.
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1 Introduction
In times of dramatic global changes (e.g., migration, climate) and profound real-world 
problems (e.g., mental health, populism), collective efforts are needed from all sciences, 
involving the physical sciences (e.g., chemistry, physics), life sciences (e.g., ecology, med-
icine), psychology and social sciences (e.g., sociology, linguistics, education), and their 
applied fields (e.g., engineering, economics, management, social policy). For these efforts, 
measurement is essential because it concerns the processes for producing accurate, reli-
able, comparable—thus, trustworthy quantifications (Mari et al. 2015).
Measurement and quantification are considered key to the physical sciences’ successes 
over the last 300 years (Hand 2016). But controversies arose over the idea psychology and 
social sciences could capitalise on the advantages of quantification in similar ways (Fech-
ner 1860; Stevens 1946; Thurstone1928). Specifically, not all quantification occurs through 
measurement. Quantification denotes the assignment of numerical values; measurement is 
a purposeful multi-step process, comprising operative structures for making such assign-
ments in reliable, valid and explicitly justified ways. Thus, measurement defines a process 
structure, quantification its result (Mari et al. 2017).
In the physical sciences, measurement and quantification build on concepts of metrol-
ogy (science of measurement), which involve explicit and internationally accepted defi-
nitions, principles and standards (Czichos 2011). Metrological concepts are valid for all 
physical sciences, engineering and many life-science fields, and are used to design technol-
ogies that minimise direct involvement of humans in measurement processes. But physi-
cal technologies cannot be applied to the intangible research objects studied in psychol-
ogy, social sciences and their applied fields. Instead, data about these study phenomena 
are often generated directly by persons1 (e.g., interviews assessments, observations), and 
pertinent measurement theories and quantification practices (e.g., psychometric theories, 
rating scales) have been developed largely independently from those of metrology (Michell 
2008; Stevens 1946; Torgerson 1958).
But how can concepts as fundamental to science as measurement and quantification be 
understood and applied in entirely different and even incompatible ways? What is science 
at all without some unifying ideas framing scientists’ approaches to quantify the—neces-
sarily different—research objects explored in different fields? Increasingly, scholars com-
pare and aim to integrate metrological with psychological and social-science measurement 
concepts (Berglund et  al. 2012; Finkelstein 2003; Fisher and Wilson 2020; Tobi 2014; 
Wilson et al. 2015). But, although all researchers using quantifications aim to exploit the 
powers of mathematics, a unified framework on which all sciences can build is still miss-
ing. Instead, diverse concepts, terminologies and practices are used, which hampers mutual 
understanding, identification of commonalities and differences, and establishment of com-
mon frameworks (Uher 2018a).
1 Measurement directly by persons is variously conceived by metrologists as measurement with persons, 
humans as measurement instrument, human-based measurement, or persons as data generation systems 
(Berglund 2012; Pendrill 2014).
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1.1  A transdisciplinary approach to comparing measurement practices
To compare different sciences’ measurement theories and quantification practices regard-
ing their most-basic underlying principles, this article relies on the frameworks of a trans-
disciplinary and philosophy-of-science paradigm. Its more abstract perspectives help reveal 
layers of information that are different from those commonly considered, thereby providing 
new insights to help advance current debates.
1.1.1  The Transdisciplinary Philosophy‑of‑Science Paradigm for Research 
on Individuals (TPS‑Paradigm)
The Transdisciplinary Philosophy-of-Science Paradigm for Research on Individuals (TPS-
Paradigm2; Uher 2015a, c; 2018c) suits the present purposes well because it is aimed at 
making explicit the presuppositions, metatheories and methodologies underlying given sci-
entific systems (therefore philosophy-of-science) to help researchers critically reflect on; 
discuss and refine their theories and practices; and to derive ideas for new developments. 
It comprises a coherent system of interrelated philosophical, metatheoretical and methodo-
logical frameworks (therefore paradigm). In these frameworks, concepts from psychology, 
life sciences, social sciences, physical sciences and metrology that are relevant for explor-
ing research objects in or in relation to individuals have been systematically integrated, 
refined and complemented by novel ones, thereby creating unitary frameworks that tran-
scend disciplinary boundaries (therefore transdisciplinary). Moreover, the TPS-Paradigm 
puts into focus the individuals who are doing the research and generating the data to help 
open up a meta-perspective on research processes, as done in this article.
The TPS-Paradigm has already been applied (1) to integrate and expand on previous 
concepts of individuals’ psyche, behaviour, language and contexts (Uher 2013; 2015a, c; 
2016a, b); (2) to refine concepts and methodologies for comparing and taxonomising indi-
vidual differences in various phenomena and populations (Uher 2015b, c, d, e; 2018b, c), 
and (3) to critically analyse the involvement of human abilities in data generation across 
the empirical sciences (Uher 2019) as well as raters’ use of standardised assessment scales 
(Uher 2018a). These conceptual developments and analyses are demonstrated in various 
empirical studies (e.g., Uher et al. 2013a, b; Uher 2015d; Uher and Visalberghi 2016).
The present article expands on these works by comparing the epistemological, metathe-
oretical and methodological foundations of structural frameworks of measurement and 
measuring instruments from metrology with psychological and social-science theories and 
practices, focussing on constructs and their fiat measurement. But the aim is neither to 
comprehensively review a broad range of theories and practices from each field nor to pro-
vide full descriptions of those discussed because such are available in discipline-specific 
publications. Instead, important concepts are selected that serve to highlight commonali-
ties and differences in the most basic principles underlying theories and practices used to 
quantify properties of physical versus psychical and social study phenomena. The aim is to 
elaborate a unified framework of metatheoretical and methodological concepts that will be 
needed to identify ways in which the most basic principles of measurement can be met in 
all sciences, while considering their study phenomena’s inherent differences.
2 Researchonindividuals.org.
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1.1.2  Human factors: the lowest common denominator across all empirical sciences
To enable transdisciplinary comparisons, and in line with the TPS-Paradigm’s focus on sci-
entists’ own role in research processes (Uher 2015a, c), analyses start from the fact that, in 
all sciences, measurement instruments and quantifications are created and used by humans 
(Berglund 2012). Human factors constitute the lowest common denominator in the making 
of all empirical sciences, which are, by definition, experience-based (from Greek empeiria 
meaning experience).
Every concrete experience has two aspects, the content given and individuals’ appre-
hension of it—thus, the objects of experience in themselves and the subjects experiencing 
them (Wundt 1896). Accordingly, scientists treat experiences in two fundamental ways. 
Natural scientists consider the objects of experience in their properties as conceived inde-
pendently of the subjects; this requires subtracting from the concrete experience the sub-
jective aspects always contained in it using the perspective of mediate experience (mit-
telbare Erfahrung; Wundt 1896). Therefore, natural scientists develop theories, approaches 
and technologies that help minimise these human factors’ involvement and filter out their 
effects.
Psychologists and social scientist, by contrast, explore the experiencing subjects and 
their apprehension of the experiential contents using the perspective of immediate expe-
rience (unmittelbare Erfahrung; Wundt 1896). They study subjects’ understanding and 
interpretation of the experiential contents and how this mediates individuals’ concrete 
experience of ‘reality’. Their research object is (inter-)subjectivity with all its complexity, 
diversity and possible irrationality—thus, human factors in themselves. This entails chal-
lenges because scientists can never step outside of their own position in their socio-linguis-
tic and cultural world. Psychologists and social scientists must therefore critically reflect on 
their own human factors and how these may (unintentionally) influence their explorations 
of others’ experience and (inter-)subjectivity. This constitutes a major difference to the nat-
ural sciences and requires fundamentally different approaches and methods. It also affects 
the meaning and utility that quantifications could have for investigating these phenomena, 
and the possibilities for establishing measurement processes, as explored in this article.
1.1.3  Terminological fallacies
Transdisciplinary comparisons are complicated by various terminological fallacies that 
arise because, in different disciplines, the same term may refer to different concepts (jingle-
fallacies; Thorndike 1903) or different terms to the same concept (jangle-fallacies; Kelley 
1927). To facilitate cross-scientific understanding, such fallacies will be highlighted. Terms 
will be used that may express the essential ideas of given concepts most clearly, rather than 
favouring the terms of just one science (discipline-specific terms will be put in parentheses 
where this might be helpful). This requires readers to tolerate and deal with a terminol-
ogy that, necessarily, diverges from any monodisciplinary standard. The aim is to make 
accessible discipline-specific concepts to readers from various fields to help build bridges, 
promote cross-scientific exchange and collaboration, and jointly develop measurement con-
cepts applicable to all sciences.
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1.2  Article outline
As foundation for the transdisciplinary comparisons of measurement practices, the article 
first highlights peculiarities of the different sciences’ research objects using metatheoreti-
cal concepts from the TPS-Paradigm. It introduces a metatheoretical definition of data and 
methodological concepts that highlight how human perceptual and conceptual abilities are 
involved in data generation in any science (Sect.  2). These foundations are then applied 
to metatheoretically analyse the structural measurement processes established in metrol-
ogy and physical sciences. The article elaborates two basic methodological principles by 
which physical scientists, starting out from nothing but their human abilities, have devel-
oped technical instruments that help overcome limitations in human perceptual abilities 
to enable measurement of a broad range of physical properties, including imperceptible 
ones (Sect. 3). These methodological principles are then compared with those underlying 
measurement theories and quantification processes used in psychology and social sciences. 
These transdisciplinary analyses focus on constructs and their measurement by fiat, reveal-
ing fundamental differences to metrological concepts not yet well considered (Sect. 4). But 
the two methodological principles also highlight important commonalities in the ways in 
which measurement-based quantifications can be generated across all sciences, considering 
their research objects’ inherent peculiarities (Sect. 5).
2  Relevant metatheoretical and methodological foundations
2.1  The sciences’ objects of research: peculiarities and concepts
The intangible properties of many psychical and social phenomena (e.g., psyche, social 
relationships) complicate their definition, differentiation and investigation. Moreover, 
psychologists’ study phenomena involve also those (e.g., conceptualising) by which any 
science is made (Valsiner 2012); therefore, psychologists must distinguish their study 
phenomena from the means for exploring them, as reflected in the terms psychical ver-
sus psychological (from Greek -λογία, -logia for body of knowledge; Lewin 1936; Uher 
2016a). The TPS-Paradigm provides metatheoretical concepts, integrated and refined from 
various disciplines and historical lines of thought, that define, describe and differenti-
ate properties of various kinds of phenomena3 studied in or in relation to individuals (for 
details, Uher 2015a, c; 2018a, c; 2019). The following outlines some relevant concepts.
2.1.1  Formalising modes of accessibility, conceptual differentiations 
and methodological implications
To highlight essential differences among the sciences’ study phenomena and to help for-
malise their modes of accessibility to human perception under everyday conditions (and 
thus also the ways to make them accessible under research conditions), the TPS-Paradigm 
3 A phenomenon is defined as anything that humans can perceive or make (technically) perceivable and/or 
that humans can conceive (Uher 2015c). Note this notion differs from some theoretical and philosophical 
definitions (e.g., Kant’s 1998).
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considers three metatheoretical4 properties. These are (1) location relative to the studied 
individual’s body (internal–external dimension), (2) temporal extension (transient–tem-
porally stable dimension), and (3) spatial extension, conceived complementarily as physi-
cal (spatially extended) versus “non-physical” (without spatial properties). Physicality5 
denotes corporeal, bodily properties of material phenomena as well as properties that are 
not corporeal in themselves but become manifest in material phenomena with which they 
are systematically connected, thus immaterial physical.
Physical phenomena can be described in terms of their spatial properties (even if only 
subatomic), whereas spatial properties cannot be conceived at all for “non-physical” phe-
nomena (e.g., psyche), which are therefore not simply contrasted against the physical but 
conceived as complementary instead (indicated by the quotation marks). This distinction 
resembles Descartes’ res extensa and res cogitans (Descartes et al. 1983) but implies only 
a methodical and not also an ontological dualism (Uher 2015c, 2016a, 2019). This fol-
lows the concept of complementarity,6 which emphasises the necessity to account for the 
observation of two categorically different realities that require different approaches, frames 
of reference and criteria of truth, such as the wave-particle duality of light and matter 
(Bohr 1937; Heisenberg, 1927) and psyche-physicality (body-mind) properties (Brody and 
Oppenheim 1969; Fahrenberg 1979, 2013; Walach and Römer 2011).
The particular constellation of metatheoretical properties that can be conceived for 
study phenomena also enables their conceptual differentiation as well as derivation of 
methodological concepts for investigations. This is now briefly illustrated in three study 
phenomena relevant for the present analyses—behaviours, psyche and constructs.
2.1.2  Behaviours: immaterial but physical phenomena external to individuals
Behaviours, defined as the “external changes or activities of living organisms that are 
functionally mediated by other external phenomena in the present moment” (Uher 2016b, 
p. 490), involve properties that are externally located, transient and (mostly immaterial) 
physical (e.g., movements, vocalizations, secretions). Their public accessibility enables 
multiple persons to jointly perceive the same behavioural acts and the same entities of the 
properties studied in them using so-called extroquestive7 methods.8 Extroquestive acces-
sibility helps establish inter-subjectivity, an important meta-condition of measurement (see 
7 The concepts of extroquestion and introquestion (from the Latin extro for beyond, outside; intro for in, 
within; and quaerere for to seek, enquire) were developed to remedy conceptual leaps in previous concepts 
of introspection versus extrospection, commonly defined as inward versus outward perspectives. These lat-
ter concepts cannot be differentiated from one another as methods because both perspectives are always 
contained in any given perception. The new concepts highlighted that psychophysical experiments, com-
monly classified as introspective methods, actually constitute extroquestive methods (for details, Uher 
2016a, 2019).
8 Extroquestive methods are defined as “procedures for studying phenomena that individuals can perceive 
as from outside of themselves (e.g., behavioural observation) and that are (or can be made) perceptible by 
multiple individuals (e.g., using invasive methods like surgery; Uher 2019, p. 231).
4 Metatheoretical here indicates their abstract level of consideration; only time and space constitute onto-
logical categories.
5 Physicality here refers to classical physics concepts, because they match everyday experiences in contrast 
to those of quantum physics.
6 The TPS-Paradigm builds on the concept of complementarity, describing two mutually exclusive proper-
ties of a research object that are irreducible and maximally incompatible with one another but both required 
for an exhaustive understanding of it, and that may thus be regarded as complementary to one another 
(Bohr 1937; Brody and Oppenheim 1969; Fahrenberg 1979; Heisenberg 1927).
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below). Behaviours’ spatial properties enables application of physical methods9 of investi-
gation (e.g., pedometer). Their transience and processual nature requires methods enabling 
their real-time capture, called nunc-ipsum methods10 (Uher 2019). This constellation of 
metatheoretical properties differs from those conceived for the psyche.
2.1.3  The phenomena of the psyche: experiential processes
The psyche is defined as the “entirety of the phenomena of the immediate experiential 
reality both conscious and non-conscious of living organisms” (Uher 2015c, p. 431), with 
immediacy indicating absence of phenomena mediating their perception (Wundt 1896). 
The particular forms regarding the three metatheoretical properties that can be conceived 
for psychical phenomena highlight peculiarities that complicate their accessibility to inves-
tigation (Uher 2016a). Their lack of spatial properties and of systematic relations to the 
physical phenomena with which they are connected (e.g., brain morphology, physiol-
ogy)—reflecting complementary psyche-physicality (body-mind) relations—make psychi-
cal phenomena inaccessible to physical technologies (Fahrenberg 1979, 2013). Psychical 
phenomena are conceived as located entirely internal to individuals’ bodies, directly per-
ceivable by each individual itself but inaccessible to others (Locke 1999), requiring so-
called introquestive7 methods11 of investigation.
Temporal properties vary. Ongoing psychical events (e.g., thoughts, emotions) are tran-
sient, therefore called experiencings (Erleben). Temporally more extended phenomena 
(e.g., beliefs, knowledge, mental abilities) are called memorised psychical resultants (expe-
riences, Erfahrung), with memorisation referring to any retention process. But, although 
temporally extended, they are accessible only in individuals’ experiencings and must be 
reconstructed in each moment anew within the given context, whereby they are adapted 
and changed before becoming memorised again (Schacter and Addis 2007). Therefore, 
psychical phenomena must be conceived as occurrents (perdurants in formal ontology)—
as processes.
Of processual entities, only a part exists at any moment so that they cannot be deter-
mined without knowledge of previous occurrences. Occurrents are opposed to continuants 
(endurants in formal ontology), which do exist in their entirety at any moment (e.g., mate-
rial objects). As processes, psychical phenomena can be conceived only through abstrac-
tion from their occurrences over time. This leads to beliefs and knowledge about them, 
which are psychical phenomena in themselves as well, but not the same as those they are 
about (see Uher 2015d, 2016a; similarly Whitehead 1929).
The psyche’s capacities for abstraction are essential for thinking, and thus for the mak-
ing of science. Abstractions also constitute important study phenomena in themselves.
9 Physical methods are defined as “procedures relying on the spatial extension of materials that are system-
atically related to the physical phenomena [and their properties] under study, directly perceptible and easier 
to demarcate and categorise than the study phenomena [and properties] (e.g., length of a spring scale to 
measure weight; Uher 2019, p. 231).
10 Nunc-ipsum methods (from the Latin nunc ipsum for at this very instant) are defined as “procedures ena-
bling the real-time recording of transient phenomena (e.g., behavioural observation, experience sampling”; 
Uher 2019, p. 231).
11 Introquestive methods are defined as “procedures for studying phenomena perceivable only from within 
the individual itself and that cannot be made perceptible by multiple individuals under all possible condi-
tions (e.g., inner self- observation, self-report”; Uher 2019, p. 231).
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2.1.4  Constructs as study phenomena: abstract conceptual entities
Many psychological and social-science objects of research are abstractions and complex 
ideas that are theoretically constructed by humans, therefore called constructs (Slaney 
2017). Examples of these conceptual entities are ‘intelligence’, ‘socio-economic status’, 
‘populism’ but also ‘climate’, ‘biological fitness’, and ‘heritability’ studied in the life sci-
ences. Their abstract theoretical nature entails that any given construct always refers to 
several concrete entities, which may involve occurrences and continuants of physical phe-
nomena (e.g., behaviours, temperature, material objects) but also various “non-physical” 
phenomena (e.g., emotions, thoughts, social relationships). Abstraction involves that some 
aspects of the concrete entities to which a construct refers are emphasised and others deem-
phasised (Whitehead 1929). Differences in the particular referents, aspects and levels of 
abstraction that persons (implicitly) consider enable unparalleled proliferation, complex-
ity and thus changeability in the constructs created. Therefore, theoretical definitions of 
constructs meant to denote the same conceptual entity can vary (e.g., different definitions 
of ‘socio-economic status’ or ‘intelligence’) and, as a consequence, also the operational 
definitions devised for generating data about them (see below).
2.2  Data generation across the sciences: metatheoretical and methodological 
concepts
To enable transdisciplinary comparisons and considering the role that human factors play 
in all empirical sciences, both technical measuring instruments and the data-generating 
persons in themselves must be analysed for the functions they fulfil in measurement pro-
cesses. This is seldom done in any science. For this purpose, a metatheoretical definition 
of data and methodological principles of data generation highlighting the involvement of 
human abilities are now briefly outlined and then applied to pinpoint key differences in 
measurement practices among sciences (Sects. 3 and 4).
2.2.1  What are data? A semiotic definition
The signs used to indicate quantifications (e.g., Arabic numerals, Latin letters) and to 
which particular scientific communities attribute particular meanings (e.g., mathemati-
cal properties) are commonly called data.12 As signs (e.g., variable names, values), the 
function of data is to represent in physically persistent ways (e.g., print, digital) informa-
tion about properties of the study phenomena as conceived by the data-generating persons. 
These representational functions of signs are so deeply engrained in our everyday language 
and thinking that we seldom become aware that any sign comprises three constituents. 
These are (1) a physical constituent (e.g., visual ink patterns) used as signifier that sym-
bolically represents (2) the referent, the actual object of consideration to which it refers 
(e.g., property, physical object), and (3) the meaning (the signified) that both have for the 
sign-using persons, which in itself is a psychical phenomenon (Fig. 1; similarly Ogden and 
Richards 1923).
12 This semiotic notion of data corresponds to the linguistic habits of many empirical researchers but dif-
fers from information-theoretical notions, in which data are conceived as elements of information (e.g., 
Floridi 2019).
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These triadic interrelations among signifier, referent and meaning, involving both physi-
cal and psychical phenomena, are conceived in the TPS-Paradigm’s metatheoretical con-
cept of semiotic representations. It specifies, on an abstract level, the basic ideas underly-
ing sign systems (e.g., written and spoken language; Uher 2015a, 2016b, 2018a, 2019). 
The term representation highlights that it is persons’ psychical representation (meaning) 
that connects a signifier with its referent, thereby establishing the triadic relationship that 
first turns this composite into a sign and creates its functionality. This highlights that a sign 
is more than just its signifier (as common parlance often implies) because its meaning is 
not inherent to the signifier itself but only assigned to it. Therefore, the same signifier (e.g., 
visual patterns like I, V, X) can have different meanings (e.g., Roman numbers or letters). 
Which particular meaning a signifier has for particular persons and which particular refer-
ents it represents for them is not directly apparent from the signifier itself (with very few 
exceptions, e.g., icons).
Semiotic representations have important functions for abstract thinking—and for meas-
urement. They allow humans to represent perceivable phenomena and their properties (e.g., 
one green bean) in single words (e.g., written or spoken as ‘one’, ‘green’, ‘bean’). Words 
enable us to make concrete entities (referents) independent of their immediate perception 
and to abstract them into objects of consideration (conceptual entities, the signified)—thus, 
reifying them (e.g., ‘quantity’, ‘green colour’, ‘beans’). Through this so-called hypostatic 
abstraction (Peirce 1958, CP 4.227), we develop words that refer to concrete referents not 
only while we can perceive them but also in their absence, thus abstracted from the ‘here 
and now’. It also allows us to develop abstract words that have not concrete but abstract 
referents, such as concepts and ideas describing phenomena and properties that are distant 
from immediate perception (e.g., ‘vegetables’) or imperceptible in themselves (e.g., ‘quan-
tity’, ‘nutrition’)—thus, constructs. Hence, every word is a concept in itself (Khanam et al. 
2019; Vygotsky 1962)—an important point for language-based methods of data collection 
(see below).
These metatheoretical analyses highlight that lexical and numerical data (e.g., variable 
names and values) can be used to represent information about research objects (referents) 
in various degrees of abstraction, ranging from properties directly perceivable at given 
moments, over those that can only be inferred from perceivable ones, up to abstract ideas 
that are only construed by humans but do not exist as concrete entities in themselves (con-
structs). But the level of abstraction represented by particular data is not apparent from the 
Referent
(actual study 
phenomena and 
their properties 
under study)
Meaning
(the signified)
Signifier
(physical representation 
of meaning and referent)
Triadic
Composite
=
Sign
v = 2 
Fig. 1  Data as semiotic representations comprising three composites
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signifiers in themselves (e.g., written words, mathematical symbols). This has important 
implications for data generation, analysis and interpretation, especially regarding psycho-
logical and social-science constructs (see below).
2.2.2  Conversions of information: the essence of data generation
When assigning quantitative values during measurement execution, information about the 
objects and properties under study are encoded into the signs used as data. When informa-
tion13 from one kind of phenomenon (e.g., physical objects, behaviours) are represented in 
another kind of phenomenon (e.g., signifiers printed on paper), this is called conversion of 
information in the TPS-Paradigm. This term is very broad; for any specific case, it requires 
specification of what kind of information is converted in what ways into what other kind 
of information. This is commonly done explicitly in metrology, but not so in psychology 
and social sciences (Uher 2018a). In metrology, engineering and also in psychophysics, 
information conversion is commonly called transduction; in other fields, also translation or 
transcription (e.g., molecular biology). But unlike those, the concept of information con-
version explicitly refers to person-executed processes and specifies possible sources of the 
(considerable) losses and inaccuracies that may inevitably occur in them (detailed in Uher 
2019). Information conversions are the essence of any data generation, whether executed 
by persons directly or using technical measuring instruments (see below).
2.2.3  Person‑based measurement execution and data generation: abilities 
and decisions required
For every person-executed conversion of quantitative information (e.g., reading scale dis-
plays of measuring devices, observing and encoding behaviours), persons must make deci-
sions about how to identify the information of interest in the study phenomena. In all sci-
ences, however, measurement theories commonly do not explicitly consider the role that 
measurement-executing persons in themselves must fulfil in measurement processes and 
what abilities and decisions are required from them.
Three important tasks must be accomplished in any data generation: demarcation, cat-
egorisation and encoding (information conversion; Uher 2018a). First, in the multifaceted 
perceptions available at any moment, data-generating persons must be able to reliably 
demarcate the entities of interest using similarities and dissimilarities in the study phe-
nomena’s properties. For measurement, this must involve both qualitative and quantitative 
properties. This is because quantity denotes divisible properties of entities of the same 
kind, thus of the same quality, whereas quality denotes properties of different kind (Hart-
mann 1964). Accordingly, measurement-executing persons must first determine the study 
properties’ quality and then compare entities of the same quality regarding their divisible 
properties. This presupposes that the qualitative and quantitative properties used for demar-
cation are (made) directly and accurately perceivable for the data-generating person. Tem-
perature, for example, is directly perceivable but not accurately enough so that entities can-
not be reliably demarcated, whereas directly perceivable material phenomena (e.g., tubed 
13 In the TPS-Paradigm, the term information denotes relations among elements (in the mathematical sense 
as set members, not as chemical elements); these elements are not considered data in themselves (as done in 
information-theoretical definitions of data). Instead, data are conceived as semiotic representations.
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mercury), given their corporeal and temporally more extended properties, enable reliable 
demarcations. Some study phenomena feature considerable variations in their perceivable 
properties (e.g., spatial extensions of biological cells and behavioural acts vary). This com-
plicates demarcations and requires data-generating persons to make decisions about what 
constitutes one entity (e.g., individual cells, single acts).
Second, measurement-executing persons must categorise the entities thus-demarcated 
(e.g., individual cells into cell types, single behavioural acts into behavioural categories). 
This involves not only consideration of their perceivable properties (e.g., qualities, different 
structures) but often also theoretical and contextual interpretations, especially in psychical 
and social phenomena. Behaviours, for example, are commonly categorised by their known 
(or assumed) functions because perceivably similar acts can have different meanings in dif-
ferent contexts (Uher 2015b).
Third, measurement-executing persons must convert information from the entities thus-
categorised into information encoded in the data. For systematic and standardised encod-
ing, scientists must specify all three constituents of the particular signs used as data. That 
is, they must specify the decisions that the measurement-executing persons have to make 
about which pieces of information from the phenomena and properties under study should 
be demarcated and categorised in what ways, and the rules by which these should be 
assigned to the signifiers (e.g., mathematical symbols, lexical descriptions). These speci-
fications must be made explicit and involve properties that are directly and accurately per-
ceivable by data-generating persons during measurement execution (Uher 2018a, 2019).
Developing inter-subjective agreement in demarcation, categorisation and encoding 
is facilitated when the study phenomena are (or can be made) publicly accessible, thus 
extroquestively. But in phenomena that cannot be made publicly accessible by any means 
and are accessible only to each individual, thus only introquestively (e.g., psychical phe-
nomena), inter-subjective agreement can be developed only indirectly and always involves 
uncertainty about the actual entities and properties considered. This has particular implica-
tions for psychological and social-science measurement (see below).
These metatheoretical and methodological foundations are now applied to scrutinise 
and compare the different sciences’ theories and practices of measurement.
3  Metrological concepts of measurement: metatheoretical 
and methodological foundations
Metrologists emphasise that measurement specifies not only a functional relationship con-
necting a measurement system’s input with its output. Measurement is a purposeful multi-
stage process characterised by its structure that guarantees the reliability of the results 
produced and that justifies the ways in which this is achieved (Maul et  al. 2018). Basic 
metrological concepts are now explored using a terminology and examples that are primar-
ily aimed at making them accessible to psychologists and social scientists.
3.1  Methodology versus methods: different levels of scientific enquiry
For metrologists, the generic description of the structure of a measurement process, includ-
ing the logical organisation of all operations involved, is called a measurement method. It 
is a component of a more complex system, which starts from a measurement principle and 
also includes a measurement procedure (JCGM200:2012 JCGM200 2012, def. 2.5). This 
 J. Uher 
1 3
metrological use of the term method, however, is confusing for psychologists and social 
scientists for whom it has a different meaning (jingle-fallacy).
In psychology and social sciences, method is distinguished from methodology. Meth-
odology denotes the system of principles underlying the conduct of scientific enquiry. It 
provides the philosophical and theoretical underpinning of the ways (approaches) in which 
research objects can be explored and that make particular operations suited for this purpose 
and others not, together with explanations of what their results indicate and why. Method, 
in turn, denotes the selection and construction of specific behaviours and instruments 
(practices, techniques) used to perform particular research operations (e.g., observing, vid-
eotaping, interviewing, self-reporting). Hence, methodology is the higher-order concept; 
it comprises the classification of methods together with their underlying philosophical and 
theoretical rationales (Kothari 2004).
In metrology, this important differentiation is often not made explicit, likely because 
epistemologies, which can lead to fundamentally different methodologies, are much less 
diverse than those used in psychology and social sciences (Sect. 4). Nevertheless, metro-
logical concepts incorporate methodology as well, though under different terms, and, con-
fusingly for other scholars, labelled as method.
3.2  Structure of measurement processes
Metrologists conceive measurement as a complex structured process in which a measure-
ment task is fulfilled by applying theoretical and methodological principles and by execut-
ing procedures and techniques (methods) for data generation (Mari et al. 2017).
The measurement task must be defined by specifying the objects under measurement 
(e.g., individuals I, their bodily entities E and behaviours like talking activities T), the 
property of interest (e.g., body length L, temporal duration D), and the measurands, thus 
the specific entities to be measured in the study property (JCGM200:2012, 2012, def. 2.3), 
such as the body lengths la, lb and lc of target individuals ia ib and ic, and the temporal dura-
tions da, db and dc and average sound volumes va, vb and vc of their talking activities ta, tb 
and tc during a meeting m1.
Then, the general model of the measuring system—the measurement methodology—
must be specified involving the design of measurement procedures and measuring instru-
ments as well as explanations of how they enable capturing the study property (e.g., 
loudness of talking). Therefore, scientists design process structures that enable empirical 
interactions with the study property (e.g., sound volume). Measuring systems are based 
on the (necessarily idealised) identification of systematic (lawful) structural connections 
among properties or at least specific assumptions about such connection networks, which 
allow scientists to check measurement results via experimental cross-validation (Mari et al. 
2017).
From the general model (methodology), metrologists then derive a specific model of the 
measuring system regarding the specific study objects that bear the measurands (e.g., target 
individuals ia, ib and ic, their bodily entities ea, eb and ec, and talking activities ta, tb and 
tc in meeting m1). This also involves a model of the measurands, thus the specific entities 
to be measured in the study property, such as the lengths la, lb and lc of these individuals’ 
bodies or the temporal durations da, db and dc of their talking behaviours. In such models, 
necessarily, the objects and the properties studied in them—as they occur in the actual 
world—are idealised and approximated (abstracted) to demarcate them as entities from the 
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actual world, corresponding to the particular entities intended to be measured (Mari et al. 
2017).
Thereafter, scientists must define the specific parameters to be measured (encoded in 
variables) as well as the measurement model comprising assumptions on their interrela-
tions including any calculation to produce the measurement result (e.g., weighting). This 
involves the operational definition of the objects and properties studied (called operation-
alisation in psychology and social sciences). Scientists must also specify the particular 
procedural operations (methods) that the measurement-executing persons have to per-
form given the theoretical and methodological specifications made. These operations must 
enable an empirical interaction between study property and measuring instrument during 
measurement execution. All this occurs before persons can execute the actual measurement 
procedure to generate results (e.g., by using technical instruments). For simplicity, the vari-
ous types of measurement uncertainty involved along this multi-stage process are not con-
sidered here (for details, Mari et al. 2015, 2017).
To distinguish measurement from other processes of evaluation (e.g., opinion making), 
metrologists specify two meta-conditions of measurement and concepts for implementing 
them in measurement processes.
3.3  Object‑dependent and reproducible measurement processes
A first metrological meta-condition is that measurement processes must be designed from 
knowledge about the objects and properties studied, therefore called object-dependence, 
object-relatedness or object-ivity (Mari and Wilson 2015). It requires explanations of the 
ways in which specific operative structures enable the assignment of specific numeric val-
ues to the measurands (entities to be measured in the study property) such that these values 
reveal reliable and valid information about them. An important condition is that these pro-
cesses are able to convey information specifically on the measurand, and not also on other 
properties featured by the research object or states of the surrounding. Instead, the process 
design should minimise such influence properties’ effects (Mari et  al. 2017). The ability 
to reproduce a given measurement process on the same or similar objects given particular 
conditions, including changes in the experimental context in which the results are achieved 
(e.g., locations, operators, measuring instruments), is called measurement reproducibility 
(Mari et al. 2015). Note, reproducibility here refers to the process, not only to the results.
The term object of research is not commonly used by psychologists and social scientists 
who mostly study abstract ideas and other intangible phenomena (e.g., psyche, social struc-
tures) in or in relation to individuals (formerly subjects, now participants). Therefore, the 
term object-dependence cannot have the same denotation as in metrology. But independent 
of that, an analogue concept is lacking in psychological and social-science measurement 
(see below).
3.4  Subject‑independent results
A second metrological meta-condition is that measurement processes do not depend on the 
opinions of the persons (subjects) operating them. Instead, the process design must ensure 
that results are invariant with respect to the persons involved; therefore called subject-
independence, subject-transparency (terms uncommon in psychological and social-science 
measurement) or inter-subjectivity. It requires that the quantitative values assigned to the 
measurands must be univocally interpretable in different places and times, thus in the same 
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ways by the persons generating and those using them. Hence, subject-independence is a 
condition of the results’ public interpretability, which ensures that results always represent 
the same information regarding the measurands (Mari et al. 2017).
The term inter-subjectivity is used in similar ways in psychology and social sciences, 
where it primarily refers to individuals’ shared agreement (e.g., in perception, interpreta-
tion or meaning of something). But, in these fields, objectivity is opposed to subjectiv-
ity and denotes independence of results from the investigator (e.g., test administrator). 
Accordingly, objectivity is commonly interpreted as inter-subjectivity and not as alignment 
to the object of research, thus confounding two metrological key concepts of measurement. 
This highlights a profound cross-scientific jingle-fallacy in the term objectivity, which is 
therefore not used here.
An important means to establish object-dependence in measurement processes and their 
results’ subject-independence is implementation of two types of traceability. They high-
light two basic methodological principles underlying metrologists’ structural frameworks 
of measurement that are applicable also across sciences (see below).
3.5  Data generation traceability
To justify that the generated results are attributable to the objects and properties studied, 
numerical assignments must be systematically connected through unbroken documented 
chains of comparisons to the measurand and a reference (e.g., standard unit). Every step in 
the chain involves the possibility that the entities of the connected properties (e.g., meas-
urand and measurement unit) can be compared with one another regarding their quantities 
(Mari and Wilson 2015) so that quantitative information from one property can be con-
verted (transduced) into quantitative information in another property.
By implementing unbroken documented chains of quantitative information conversion, 
scientists establish object-dependence in the measurement process. This allows to trace 
the measurement results thus-created, in the inverse direction, back to the measurands and 
the particular references (e.g., standard units) used to quantify them (Fig. 2); this is called 
data-generation traceability in the TPS-Paradigm (Uher 2018a). Maybe this kind of trace-
ability is so self-evident for metrologists and already implied by their concept of object-
dependence, that it is not explicitly mentioned in metrological research, which focusses 
only on numerical traceability (see next). But data generation traceability underlies all 
measuring instruments and highlights essential metatheoretical principles for their con-
struction (see below). Moreover, and importantly, it is a key concept in which metrologi-
cal and physical measurement processes differ from many psychological and social-science 
practices of quantification (see below) and is therefore conceived as a separate concept in 
the TPS-Paradigm.
3.6  Numerical (metrological) traceability and references
The universal (subject-independent) meaning of numerical values assigned in measure-
ment processes (e.g., the specific length of 1 m) arises from internationally accepted con-
ventions about explicitly defined standard units that are systematically connected through 
unbroken documented calibration chains to primary references. A primary reference can be 
a measurement standard or the definition of a measurement unit through its practical reali-
sation, such as an object (e.g., prototypes), a system, or an experiment involving a defined 
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relationship to the quantity of interest (JCGM200:2012, 2012). For many physical quanti-
ties, metrologists have defined primary standard references (e.g., international prototype 
kilogram; Quinn 2010). These are linked through unbroken documented chains of com-
parisons (called calibration chains), first, to different secondary references (e.g., national 
standards) and, from there, to working references (e.g., measuring sticks in science labs and 
private households). For every comparison, metrologists specify uncertainties as a quan-
titative indication of a result’s quality and reliability (JCGM100:2008, JCGM100 2008). 
Documented calibration chains ensure that any comparisons with working references that 
are traced to the same primary standard reference will produce comparable results for the 
same measurand (De Silva 2002) that can thus be understood all around the globe in the 
same ways, thus subject-independently (inter-subjectively). This is called metrological 
traceability (Mari et al. 2015). For applications across the sciences, the underlying meth-
odological concept will be called numerical traceability in the TPS-Paradigm.
3.7  Measuring instruments: establishing documented unbroken connection chains 
between measurands and results
For direct comparison with psychological and social-science practices, it is useful to con-
sider the simplest and historically oldest physical measuring instruments because, in them, 
involvement of human factors is still greater and more directly apparent than in today’s 
sophisticated measuring technologies. These latter build on knowledge gained from these 
older instruments yet involve more complex physical processes, many of which impercep-
tible by humans.
In measuring instruments, metrologists implement documented unbroken connec-
tion chains that must start from the specific property to be measured in the study object, 
the input property (measurand), and its interaction with a first mediating property that is 
systematically connected to it (object-dependence). In the simplest case, this mediating 
Fig. 2  Data-generation traceability and numerical traceability
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property, in itself, is directly and accurately perceivable by measurement-executing per-
sons. In the above example of measuring individuals’ body lengths, material objects are 
used that feature the property of length in dimensions easily and accurately perceivable 
for humans (e.g., wooden sticks) and that enable direct comparison with the measurands. 
The sticks’ spatial and temporal extensions enable multiple persons to directly and jointly 
perceive the same entities of length in them. This extroquestive accessibility facilitates the 
definition of identical (or at least highly similar) entities that different people can reliably 
and inter-subjectively (subject-independently) demarcate and that can be marked on sticks 
in standardised and persistent ways for use as references. To generate results, measure-
ment-executing persons must directly compare the measurands’ length with the length of 
the units marked on the measuring stick. Person-executed comparison is possible because 
both, measurand and units, constitute quantities of the same property (length). They must 
convert the information obtained from this comparison, such as by counting units, into 
information encoded in the given signs used as data (e.g., specific lexical and numerical 
symbols encoding quantity values and length units).
Many physical properties, however, can be perceived by humans either not accurately 
enough, not easily or not at all (e.g., weight, colour, density). Then physical scientists 
introduce a further mediating property (called sensible transducer) that a) is sensitive to 
and structurally (lawfully) connected with the input property and that b) can be connected 
in turn to another property, thereby establishing a systematic mapping (Mari and Wilson 
2015). From the first mediator’s interaction with the input property, the quantity informa-
tion can be converted stepwise into further, likewise systematically connected mediating 
properties, whereby the result of each conversion step depends on the result of the previ-
ous. This unbroken documented connection chain is continued until it is possible to con-
vert the information, on the person-side end of the conversion chain, into a property that 
Fig. 3  Methodological principles underlying measuring instruments
Measurement in metrology, psychology and social sciences:…
1 3
persons can directly, reliably and inter-subjectively perceive (e.g., length of tubed mercury) 
for comparison with measurement units.
Spring scales illustrate this principle. A metal cylinder’s specific mass (measurand) is 
connected to the gravity force (mediator 1) acting on it (on earth). Gravity force acting 
on the object (called its weight) is also connected to the deflection of a spring (media-
tor 2) when the object is attached to it and that scientists, in turn, directly connect to a 
scale display with equal units marked on it (mediator 3). The properties ‘mass’—‘gravity 
force’—‘length of spring deflection’ are chained by physical laws, which establish propor-
tional relations among the specific quantities of these different properties. The connection 
between ‘length of spring deflection’—‘length of extension over scale’ is established by the 
measurement-executing person through visual comparison. The person also executes the 
final step by applying unchanging rules for converting the quantitative information thus-
obtained (e.g., by counting scale units) into semiotic information encoded in the lexical and 
numerical signs (variable names, values) serving as quantitative data (results; Fig. 3). In 
digital instruments, these last two steps are automatized to further reduce the involvement 
of human factors in measurement processes. Analogously, when measuring time using 
sand glasses, it is gravity and sand that provide mediating properties for stepwise conver-
sions of quantitative information about time periods into quantitative information directly, 
reliably and inter-subjectively (extroquestively) perceivable properties (sand grains in the 
hourglass compartments).
3.8  Conclusion: two basic methodological principles of measurement
In summary, two basic principles are crucial for measurement. (1) Data generation trace-
ability requires that the particular ways in which measurement results are assigned to the 
specific properties to be measured in the study objects must be fully transparent and there-
fore traceable. This is achieved by designing measurement processes that systematically 
connect the measurand through unbroken and documented links with the measurement 
result assigned to it (object-dependence). Therefore, measurement reproducibility refers 
to the process, not just to the results generated. (2) Numerical traceability requires that 
the numerical value of the measurement result is also linked to known standards, in docu-
mented and transparent ways, thereby establishing its inter-subjective meaning (subject-
independence). These two general methodological principles underlying metrologists’ 
structural frameworks of measurement can also be applied in psychology and social sci-
ences, although in different ways and not for all study phenomena. This highlights com-
monalities, and thus comparability that can be established across sciences, but also funda-
mental differences as explored now.
4  Psychological and social‑science concepts of measurement: 
metatheoretical and methodological foundations
Study phenomena, theories and research practices in psychology and social sciences are 
extremely heterogeneous. They involve, for example, natural-science and technology-
based investigations of individuals’ morphology (e.g., neuro-imaging), physiology (e.g., 
skin conductance) and behaviour (e.g., life-logging), software-based explorations of 
behaviour (e.g., video-analysis), investigations of textual data from individuals’ verbal 
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interactions and written documents (e.g., text mining, machine learning), or economic 
accounts of individuals’ material wealth (e.g., income). They also involve explorations 
of the intangible phenomena of the psyche (e.g., thoughts, emotions) and those emerg-
ing from individuals’ social and societal interactions (e.g., language, politics, culture) 
that are mostly studied in constructs and for which physical technologies cannot be 
applied. These latter are in the focus here.
4.1  Plurality of epistemologies and methodologies
Epistemology and especially methodology correspond to metrologists’ specification of 
the measurement method and the general model of the measuring system, comprising a 
generic description of the process structure including logical organisation of all opera-
tions. But the sciences’ different approaches for dealing with experience entail funda-
mental differences. Metrologists and natural scientists focus on the contents of expe-
riences and therefore develop technologies that help minimise involvement of human 
factors in empirical investigations and filter out their effects. Psychologists and social 
scientists, by contrast, explore how subjects understand and interpret the contents of 
their experiences and how this subjective apprehension mediates their concrete expe-
rience of ‘reality’. This highlights the “non-physical” and conceptual nature of these 
study phenomena and their unparalleled complexity, variability and changeability. 
Moreover, the aims for which these are being studied and the perspectives taken on 
them vary greatly.
All this entails a plurality of ontological and epistemological concepts, each describ-
ing different aspects of and even entirely different perspectives on people’s psychical 
and social ‘reality’ as well as different general approaches by which knowledge about 
these phenomena can be gained. Realists, for example, assume humans could access 
‘reality’ rather directly and accurately. Positivists are less concerned with finding true 
explanations of ‘reality’ and focus on empirical evidence and predictive utility instead. 
Constructivists emphasise the pronounced influence that socio-cultural beliefs have on 
people’s perception and conception of ‘reality’, which therefore differ among individu-
als and communities (including physicists regarding their own science; Hossenfelder 
2018). These are only three of many different epistemological stances, which inevi-
tably influence the methodologies that psychologists and social scientists derive from 
them and in which they specify the theory and philosophy of operations and techniques 
(methods) that enable access to and investigation of these study phenomena.
Measurement and quantification are of primary interest to realists and positivists, 
whereas, to explore people’s meaning making and the constructions and interpreta-
tions of their individual and social ‘realities’, quantifications are often uninformative. 
Therefore, constructivist epistemologies and methodologies entail so-called qualita-
tive methods, which involve analytical techniques to extract the qualities, structures and 
interrelations of meanings from textual and other verbal data (e.g., transcripts, social 
media texts) as well as systematic techniques and operational strategies to generate (or 
select) therefore suitable data (e.g., interviews, narratives)—often without aiming to 
obtain numerical information as well. Qualitative methods are contrasted with opera-
tions and techniques for generating and analysing numerical data, commonly called 
quantitative methods (e.g., rating scales). But this qualitative-quantitative dichotomisa-
tion, widespread in these fields, is inaccurate and misleading because it implies the idea 
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that quantitative data could reflect pure quantities, ignoring that quantities are always of 
something—qualities. Any investigation requires specification of the particular qualita-
tive properties studied and only some methods additionally enable collection of quanti-
tative information about them (Uher 2018a).
4.2  Fiat ‘measurement’ of constructs: fundamental challenges for implementing 
traceable conversions of quantitative information
The study phenomena’s “non-physical” and processual nature and the abstract conceptual 
level required for their exploration entail particular challenges for measurement.
4.2.1  Conceptual confusions around constructs
Although constructs constitute the primary objects of psychological and social-science 
research (Maraun et al. 2009), their definition and use are often ambiguous, inconsistent 
and afflicted with serious conceptual problems still largely ignored. A key fallacy is the 
common conflation of constructs as theoretical-logical–linguistic tools (e.g., abstractions, 
models, theoretical frameworks) with their referents, the concrete entities they are meant 
to denote (e.g., psychical processes, behaviours, income; Danziger 1997). This construct-
entity conflation (Slaney and Garcia 2015) occurs, for example, when scientists interpret 
constructs as reflecting ‘attributes’ or ‘qualities’ that individuals ‘possess’ (e.g., in Cron-
bach and Meehl 1955), as widely done in ‘trait’ psychology (Uher 2013, 2015e). It contrib-
utes to the reification of constructs, ascribing to them an ontological status. The language 
used by construct developers further contributes to this reification and misleads scientists 
to overlook the constructed nature of constructs (Slaney and Garcia 2015), and thus also 
the necessity to clearly distinguish theoretical from operational construct definition.
4.2.2  By fiat definition of measurement models: operationalising constructs 
in concrete entities
For quantitative empirical investigations, constructs, given their conceptual nature, must 
be operationally defined (operationalised) in concrete entities that are accessible and thus 
(potentially) measurable (i.e., some of their referents). This corresponds to metrologists’ 
specification of a measurement model comprising the demarcated entities to be measured 
(measurands) in the study phenomena’s properties together with assumptions on their 
interrelations to produce the measurement results. For constructs, scientists use either sin-
gle concrete entities, called proxies (e.g., annual income as single measure of ‘socio-eco-
nomic status’; citation scores as single measure of ‘research impact’), or multiple concrete 
entities, called indicators (or items in language-based methods), from which composite 
measures are derived (Oakes and Rossi 2003). However, given the complexity and abstract 
nature of constructs, no proxy and no set of indicators can be all-inclusive, because, as 
conceptual entities, constructs imply more meaning (surplus meaning) than the concrete 
entities by which they can be operationally defined. No set of indicators could ever fully 
account for the abstract and complex phenomena construed as ‘social status’, ‘intelligence’ 
or ‘populism. Construct developers must therefore decide about which particular indicators 
to include and which of their interrelations to consider and in what ways. This operational 
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definition of constructs by decree is called measurement by fiat14 in the social sciences 
(Cicourel 1964; Torgerson 1958).
To select indicators for construct operationalisation, two different approaches are used, 
psychotechnical and psychometric engineering. In psychotechnical engineering (Vautier 
et al. 2012), scientists define for the constructs under study a theoretical framework from 
which they derive an empirical framework specifying the measurable indicators used for 
operationalisation as well as specified linkages within and between these two frameworks 
(Cronbach and Meehl 1955; Messick 1995). An example is ‘socio-economic status’, for 
which social scientists specify various parameters of education, income, wealth and occu-
pation that they consider construct relevant. Similarly, psychologists specify particular 
intellectual performances that they consider indicative of a given ‘intelligence’ construct.
However, even if correspondences between theoretical definition and empirical results 
are established through explicitly defined and interlinked frameworks, it cannot be estab-
lished whether this allows to measure ‘socio-economic status’ or ‘intelligence’ as the actual 
research objects in themselves because these are conceptual entities that can be construed 
very differently (e.g., by considering different referents, aspects and levels of abstraction). 
This impossibility is reflected in social scientists’ conceptual debates about the nature of 
social stratification and the diversity of ‘socioeconomic status’ definitions and measures 
developed (Oakes and Rossi 2003). It is also reflected in ‘intelligence’ researchers’ intense 
debates, led for more than a century already, about which specific abilities (e.g., cognitive, 
emotional, social, creative) form part of ‘intelligence’ and which ones not (Spearman 1904; 
Sternberg 2018).
Given these challenges, it is unsurprising that some scientists follow operationalist epis-
temologies, according to which theoretical concepts could be defined by uniquely specified 
measurement operations (Chang 2009), such as when defining ‘intelligence’ as that “what 
an IQ-test measures” (Boring 1923; van der Maas et al. 2014). The idea that operational 
definition could substitute theoretical definition, and thus define the construct, underlies 
psychometric engineering, which is widely-used in psychology and social sciences (e.g., as 
alternative approach for defining ‘socio-economic status’; Oakes and Rossi 2003). In psy-
chometrics, construct definitions and their theoretical structure are derived from empirical 
interrelations among indicators, which have often been selected in ways unrelated to the 
theoretical constructs established from them (Thissen 2001; Vautier et al. 2012). For exam-
ple, popular ‘personality’ constructs (e.g., Big Five) were derived from empirical associa-
tions among judgements on person-descriptive words, which had been filtered from the 
English lexicon using an approach unrelated to any ‘personality’ theory (Uher 2015d).
4.2.3  Psychometric instruments and ‘measurement’ theories
In psychometrics, a first aim is to identify suitable sets of indicators (e.g., cognitive tasks, 
survey items) using empirical structures in the results that can be generated with them. 
For example, substantial interrelations among results (internal consistency) may sug-
gest that the indicators capture phenomena and properties that can be conceived as form-
ing a coherent entity as construed in a given construct. However, high internal consist-
ency also implies considerable redundancies among the indicators. Redundancies can be 
14 Derived from the Latin fiat for let it be done.
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created easily through hypostatic abstraction (e.g., by emphasising aspects differently) and 
are therefore widespread in conceptual thinking and human language (Lahlou 1996). But 
in natural systems (e.g., biological systems), ecological and evolutionary pressures may 
constrain the occurrence of redundancies. Indeed, associations among functionally-related 
behaviours are often only moderate or absent such as occurrences of non-contact and con-
tact aggression (Uher et al. 2013a; Uher 2015b). This may explain why redundancy-based 
methods of data analysis (e.g., factor analysis) are hardly used outside of psychology and 
social sciences (Uher 2015d; Trofimova et al. 2018).
A second aim of psychometrics is to derive composite measures for constructs from the 
results obtained for their indicators. For this reason, sets of indicators are commonly called 
psychometric ‘measuring’ instruments (e.g., questionnaires, ‘intelligence’ tests). Various 
psychometric ‘measurement’ theories were developed for this purpose; most important are 
classical test theory and probabilistic latent trait theory (e.g., item response theory, Rasch 
modelling). They allow to define, on the basis of statistical assumptions, psychometric 
‘measurement’ models in which the construct, because it is a conceptual entity and thus 
non-observable in itself, is encoded as a latent variable, and the indicators, because they 
are concrete observable entities, as manifest variables. Commonly, the quantity values cre-
ated for these variables are labelled scores because the term value denotes a quality that 
renders something desirable or valuable (a cross-scientific jingle-fallacy).
These psychometric models build on the assumption that, irrespective of the methods 
used, invariant quantities exist for constructs (e.g., person ability), therefore called true 
scores or latent trait scores. Given these naïve realist assumptions, psychometricians aim to 
develop ideal methods (e.g., purposefully designed rating scales or ‘intelligence’ tests) that 
allow to empirically implement identity functions that turn these pre-existing true or latent 
scores into estimated scores that can be derived from the manifest indicator scores (with 
defined errors or probabilities, respectively; Mari et al. 2017; Uher 2018a). From statisti-
cal assumptions and assumptions about particular influencing factors (e.g., item difficulty, 
guessing, inattentiveness), psychometricians model what manifest scores can, theoretically, 
be obtained for an indicator given particular true or latent scores on the construct level 
(e.g., probabilistic variation around the hypothetical construct score). Such test-theoretical 
models are then used to infer (estimate) from the test persons’ empirically obtained mani-
fest indicator scores their latent or true scores for the underlying (latent) construct (e.g., 
‘ability’ score).
This widespread equation of constructs with latent variables, however, is based on the 
erroneous equation of constructs and with the phenomena they are meant to represent 
(construct-referent conflation; Maraun and Gabriel 2013), which places the ontology of 
constructs into their operational definition. This fallacy, which occurs in psychometric and 
psychotechnical engineering alike (e.g., in Cronbach and Meehl 1955), blurs the nature of 
the relations between theoretically constructed concepts (constructs) and the phenomena 
they are intended to represent (their referents; Slaney and Garcia 2015). It may also have 
contributed to the misconception of construct operationalisation as constituting a step of 
measurement.
4.3  Construct operationalisation is not measurement
In fiat ‘measurement’, scientists assume, given a particular theory (e.g., statistical or con-
tent-related), face validity, common-sense or intuition, that particular concrete entities are 
representative referents of a given construct. But these assumptions cannot be proven. The 
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links between construct and indicators can be established only by decree because con-
structs are socio-culturally constructed and may therefore vary substantially across (also 
scientific) communities. For example, meaning, composition and operationalisation of 
‘socio-economic status’ constructs vary substantially across countries due to geographic, 
cultural and socio-economic differences (Psaki et al. 2014). For object-dependent investi-
gations of the study phenomena’s qualities, consideration of these variations is essential, 
but they hinder object-dependent investigation of the quantities that may occur in these 
qualities, as required for measurement.
It follows that construct operationalisation cannot constitute a step of measurement15 
as implied by the term fiat ‘measurement’. Instead, it reflects decisions and assumptions 
made by scientists about which sets of indicators may meaningfully reflect the abstract idea 
represented by a construct, which can and should be made explicit and inter-subjectively. 
Selecting indicators to explore how individuals apprehend the contents of their experi-
ence of ‘reality’ requires interpretive analysis; this cannot be accomplished experimentally. 
These interpretive decisions are essential because they concern the qualitative properties 
of the study phenomena to which a given construct is meant to refer. But crucially, these 
by-fiat decisions do not establish documented and unbroken connection chains from hypo-
thetical measurands in the constructs—i.e., quantitative (divisible) properties of the quali-
ties under study—to possible quantitative properties in the phenomena used as indicators, 
as required for measurement (object-dependence). This precludes the establishment of data 
generation traceability, a methodological key principle of measurement (Fig. 4).
The necessarily decision-based linkage of constructs with their indicators differs fun-
damentally from the measurement of physical properties, for which neither the parameters 
nor their interrelations can be defined by decree. Instead, they have to be developed and 
defined on the basis of existing physical properties and their structural (lawful) connections 
that scientists must identify experimentally.
But importantly, this is a consequence of these phenomena’s properties, not of the 
scientists’ concepts. Indeed, when applying their structural framework of measurement 
(Sect.  3.2) to social-science phenomena, metrologists specified in mathematical equa-
tions various relations that equated the construct ‘research performance’ with ‘quality of 
research products’ and the latter with ‘research impact’, which they then operationalised 
with citation scores and declared these relations’ “existence is assumed and not further 
discussed” (Mari et  al. 2017). This clearly reflects decisions by decree (fiat) and a psy-
chotechnical approach. The expression of assumed relations in mathematical equations is 
foundational also for test-theoretical approaches in psychology and social sciences; this is 
not specific to metrology. But the metrologists failed to recognise the conceptual nature of 
the abstract ideas like ‘research performance’, ‘research quality’ and ‘innovation’ that they 
discussed and the inherently interpretive nature of the decreed relations between these con-
structs and their operationalisations.
15 Construct operationalisation also differs fundamentally from fuzzy measurement, which specifies ways 
for representing epistemological plausibilities or probabilities for particular beliefs or events (Billingsley 
1995). Thus, fuzzy measurement is concerned not with operationally defining concepts but instead with 
generating scores, which constitutes a subsequent step in measurement processes.
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5  Conclusions
5.1  Measurement processes can be established only for construct indicators 
but not for constructs in themselves
These methodological analyses highlight that constructs in themselves cannot be meas-
ured. The frequent notion of ‘construct measurement’ and ‘measuring instruments’ for con-
structs (e.g., questionnaires) is oversimplifying and misleading, and likely a result of the 
widespread construct-referent conflation. But measurement processes can be established 
for many of the concrete entities chosen as construct indicators (referents). Hence, object-
dependence as a meta-condition of measurement cannot refer to constructs as the actual 
research objects but only to the indicators used for their operationalisation—precisely 
because these are accessible and thus (potentially) measurable (Fig. 4). This differentiation 
is crucial because indicators are neither the construct in itself nor specific quantities of it. 
Constructs and their indicators constitute different entities (conceptual vs concrete; e.g., 
‘socio-economic status’ vs income).
Results obtained for construct indicators (e.g., performances in ‘intelligence’ test) can 
be used to draw inferences about the abstract entity construed (e.g., ‘intelligence’). But 
because the links connecting constructs with their indicators are established not on the 
basis of lawful empirical connections persisting across time and contexts (as in measure-
ment of physical properties) but by interpretive decisions (by fiat), one-to-one correspond-
ences cannot exist and inferences to the construct level are, necessarily, interpretive as well 
Conversions of quantitative information in unbroken connection chains
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Fig. 4  Construct operationalisation is not measurement. Note: Construct operationalisation involves deci-
sions on qualitative properties but not conversions of quantitative information as required for measurement
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and can never be proven. This explains why different operationalisations lead to different 
results for the same construct and individual (e.g., IQ-scores typically vary across ‘intelli-
gence’ tests). Clear awareness of the inherently interpretive nature of inferences from indi-
cator results to constructs has particular relevance for legal contexts, where the validity of 
psychometric scores as legal evidence (e.g., persons’ ‘intelligence’) is increasingly being 
questioned and may soon be challenged in courts (Barrett 2018) similar to psychiatric diag-
nostic practices before (Faust 2012).
The two basic methodological principles of measurement (data generation traceability 
and numerical traceability) can, however, be implemented for many construct indicators, 
though not for all. In behavioural observations16 (ethological real-time or video-based cod-
ing, not ratings, see below), multiple observers can reach inter-subjective agreement in the 
demarcation, categorisation and encoding of behavioural acts because their extroquestive 
accessibility enables direct and joint perception of the same occurrences. This allows to 
establish documented and unbroken links between the entities to be measured and their 
encoding in data, thus transparency and traceability in data generation. Behaviours’ pro-
nounced variability, transient nature and context-dependent meaning entails, however, 
that a) the demarcation and categorisation of behavioural acts necessarily involves some 
defined scope for interpretation (e.g., what acts are of the same kind), and that b) observ-
ers, using nothing but their human  abilities16, can hardly ever quantify particular proper-
ties directly (e.g., duration of talking). For these reasons, observers commonly encode only 
occurrences/non-occurrences of defined behavioural acts in nominal data (1/0) from which 
post hoc—after data generation is completed—or using behavioural coding software, ratio-
scaled quantitative data can be derived (e.g., durations, frequencies; for details (Uher 2013, 
2015d, 2018a). Measurement of temporal properties is well-established; defined occur-
rences are discrete quantities (multitudes), which are countable. The meaning of the quan-
tifications thus-derived is therefore documented, transparent and subject-independent, thus 
establishing numerical traceability as a social-science analogue of metrological traceability.
Person-based measurement of behavioural phenomena, however, is largely confined to 
their physical properties (e.g., temporal, spatial). Attempts to establish object-dependent 
and thus traceable processes to generate quantitative data about interpretive and meaning 
aspects of behaviours (e.g., ‘dominance’ or ‘persuasiveness’ of talking) face limitations.
5.2  Pitfalls of language‑based methods used for quantitative data generation: 
rating items refer to concepts
Psychological and social-science investigations often involve language-based methods for 
quantitative data generation (e.g., assessment scales) in which persons are asked to respond 
to standardised descriptions of construct indicators, called items (e.g., single words, short 
sentences). Words can refer to concrete, directly perceivable entities but also to entities 
abstracted from the here and now or even imperceptible in themselves (e.g., constructs). 
The level of abstraction, however, is not directly apparent from the words themselves. This 
may have obscured the fact that, in assessment methods, many items enquire about entities 
that are abstract and not even present during data generation (e.g., past events like habitual 
behaviours as in ‘personality’ assessments). This inevitably precludes the establishment of 
16 “Observational methods involve the targeted, and thus trained, perception of the study phenomena with-
out any mechanism standing between the observer and the observed” (Uher 2019, p. 230).
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object-dependent and traceable data generation processes. Consequently, rating methods 
cannot capture information about such entities in themselves but only about persons’ perti-
nent ideas and beliefs, thus their concepts.
As abstractions and generalisations, concepts refer to various entities (referents). 
Indeed, rating items are often purposefully worded in abstract and decontextualised ways 
to make them applicable to diverse phenomena and contexts without specifying any par-
ticular ones. This requires respondents to use their common-sense knowledge to first inter-
pret the content described and to construct specific meanings for the given context. It is 
therefore unsurprising that interpretations of psychometrically selected, standardised rating 
items vary substantially within and between persons, indicating broad fields of meaning 
and substantial subjectivity in data generation (Lundmann and Villadsen 2016; Rosenbaum 
and Valsiner 2011; Uher and Visalberghi 2016; de Williams et  al. 2000). But unlike in 
observational methods, scientists commonly neither instruct nor train the data-generating 
persons to interpret rating items in standardised ways nor do they enquire about raters’ item 
interpretations and the particular referents that raters considered when judging a particular 
case. This introduces a twofold break in data generation traceability (Uher 2018a).
To create numerical data, raters are asked to indicate their judgements in predefined 
multi-stage answer categories commonly labelled lexically (e.g., agree, strongly agree, 
etc.). Researchers then assign to these answer categories numerical values in always the 
same and thus perfectly traceable ways. But this numerical assignment is only a recoding 
of data. The actual data generation is accomplished by the raters. Despite their pivotal role 
in data generation, the ways in which respondents choose their answer categories are still 
largely unexplored. First studies showed that, when choosing their answer categories on 
agreement scales, about 90% of 78 respondents considered not quantitative properties as 
commonly assumed but only qualitative properties instead (Figure 13 in Uher 2018a). But 
scientists rigidly assign always the same numerical values to the same answer categories 
regardless of raters’ category interpretations and regardless of the item content and thus 
the different qualities to which they refer. Therefore, the meaning of the numerical values 
assigned by researchers can be traced back neither to the particular measurands raters may 
have had in mind nor to some known standards that could create for these values an inter-
subjective meaning with regard to the study properties (e.g., how often must a particular 
behaviour occur to be judged as ‘often’ given that different behaviours generally occur with 
different frequencies within and across situations; Uher 2015b). This precludes establish-
ment of numerical traceability (for details; Uher 2018a).
By contrast, coding performances in educational and ‘intelligence’ tests, for which cor-
rect and incorrect responses exist, creates subject-independent and traceable meanings for 
the numerals assigned to test answers. These can be documented and be made transparent 
and publicly accessible (e.g., for enabling international comparison of test performances in 
PISA-studies), thereby establishing numerical traceability.
5.3  Composite scores derived from indicator measurements reflect artificial 
quantifications
From indicator results, psychologists and social scientists aim to derive overall scores for 
their constructs. But quantifications obtained for different indicators often refer to dif-
ferent properties and therefore cannot be simply summarised (e.g., income in monetary 
currency, education in years). Therefore, composite scores—whether using explicit rules 
derived from theoretical construct definitions in psychotechnical engineering or using 
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statistically-derived test-theoretical models in psychometrical engineering—constitute arti-
ficial quantifications. This is because, in constructs, scientists aim to summarise entities 
with heterogenous qualities, which precludes the possibility to identify in them divisible 
properties of the same quality, thus quantities. The artificial quantifications created for con-
structs may still be useful for pragmatic purposes, especially when they are derived from 
measurement-based and thus traceable indicator results (e.g., composite scores of ‘socio-
economic status’). This allows establishing comparability—but only within the limits of 
the inherently decision-based selection of indicators and of algorithms used to merge their 
results (e.g., different weighting).
5.4  Two basic methodological principles of measurement applicable 
across sciences
The transdisciplinary analyses identified two basic methodological principles that under-
lie metrologists’ structural frameworks and are crucial for measurement and that can be 
meaningfully adapted to psychologists’ and social scientists’ study phenomena, carefully 
considering their peculiarities. (1) Data generation traceability requires that assignments 
of numerical values solely depend on the properties explored in the study objects (object-
dependence) and are made fully transparent, and thus reproducible and traceable. To 
achieve this, scientists must establish unbroken documented connection chains that directly 
link (via different steps if needed) the quantitative entity to be measured in the qualitative 
study property (measurand) with the numerical value assigned to it, thus ensuring equiv-
alence between them. (2) Numerical traceability requires that scientists directly link the 
assigned numerical values also to known standards, likewise in documented and transpar-
ent ways, thereby establishing the results’ public interpretability (subject-independence).
These two methodological principles highlight important commonalities in the ways in 
which measurement-based quantifications can be generated across all sciences. They spec-
ify the foundational concepts of measurement that are required to ensure the quality of the 
quantitative information obtained and to justify the public trust placed in them. They are 
also needed to distinguish measurement-based quantifications from other (e.g., subjective) 
quantifications that may be useful for pragmatic purposes but lack epistemic authority. This 
is of particular importance for applied (e.g., legal, clinical, educational) contexts in which 
quantifications are used to make decisions about individuals. These two principles also 
open up new perspectives on the replication crises widely-discussed in various sciences 
and provide new concepts for the kind of transparency needed in scientific investigations 
for overcoming them.
5.5  Reconsider if quantifications are meaningful at all to explore given phenomena
But the analyses also highlighted some fundamental differences and limitations. Crucially, 
possibilities for implementing measurement processes are not a matter of scientific disci-
pline or their ascribed level of scientificity but solely depend on the study phenomena’s 
properties. To explore individuals (inter-)subjective understanding and interpretation of the 
contents of their experience that mediate their concrete experience of ‘reality’, scientists 
must investigate the qualities, interrelations and development of meanings. These study 
phenomena are highly complex, context-dependent and changeable. Consequently, psy-
chological and social-science concepts are not applicable uniformly across time and space 
but constantly changing as well. Rather than a deficiency, this reflects the precision and 
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object-dependence with which these scientists explore the manifold ever-changing quali-
ties that constitute the key features of their study phenomena.
Quantifications are meaningful only if the basic qualities to be studied for their pos-
sible divisible properties remain rather constant. But quantifications have little value for 
description and explanation if the qualities in themselves are undergoing permanent change 
and development. Psychologists and social scientists can learn from metrologists’ advance-
ments in measuring physical properties when it comes to obtaining precise quantitative 
information about constant properties. But metrological approaches are inadequate for 
exploring the every-changing processes of meaning making and interpretation. Interpretive 
approaches cannot be replaced by mathematical formalisations and algorithms. Metrology 
does not provide any pertinent concepts; this is the expertise of psychological and social 
scientist—and this is why scholars must collaborate across the sciences to tackle the chal-
lenges of the twenty first century.
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